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Abstract 
Bilateral monopoly, land assembly, and unanimous-consent Coasian bargaining present 
interesting strategic questions because they involve division of an economic surplus without 
competition to temper bargaining demands. We present a behavioral bargaining model in which 
payoff-maximizing proposers make offers to divide a surplus with one or more responders who 
are assumed to behave either strategically, or sincerely according to a minimum acceptable offer 
rule. We characterize equilibrium proposer and responder decisions under various scenarios 
regarding the number and type of responders, the number of bargaining periods, and the cost of 
delay. The model predictions are consistent with data from laboratory experiments. 
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1.  Introduction 
Land assembly, bilateral monopoly, and similar unanimous-consent Coasian bargaining 
problems require a proposer (e.g. the developer) to offer a division of a fixed dollar amount (e.g. 
the economic surplus from the project) to one or more responders (e.g. the land owners). If a 
project is indivisible, universal agreement of the proposal is required for the project gains to be 
realized. The land-assembly literature has focused primarily on the likelihood of bargaining 
delay and failed exchanges arising from imperfect information about the developer’s value for 
the project (Eckart 1985; Strange 1995) or the ability of sellers to delay entering into negotiation 
with the buyer (Menezes and Pitchford 2004a and 2004b; Miceli and Segerson 2007). 
Recent laboratory multilateral bargaining experiments demonstrate that, contrary to neo-
classical game theoretic predictions, bargaining delay occurs in games of simultaneous 
bargaining and perfect information about subjects’ values and costs (Cadigan, et al. 2009a, 
2009b). Furthermore, changes in the cost of delay and the number of responders affects offers, 
the extent of delay, the distribution of the surplus, and the likelihood of failed exchanges. In both 
of these earlier studies, the subgame-perfect equilibrium to the single-period and multi-period 
bargaining game is for proposers to capture the entire economic surplus. This standard model, 
however, fails to provide expectations for or adequately predict observed patterns of proposer’s 
offers, responders’ decisions, the distribution of the surplus, or the likelihood of failed 
exchanges. 
In this paper we present a behavioral bargaining model that explains the data from 
laboratory bargaining experiments. In the model, expected-payoff maximizing proposers make 
repeated take-it-or-leave-it offers to divide a surplus with one or more responders. We assume 






responders behave as payoff maximizers, and sincere responders behave according to a 
minimum acceptable offer (MAO) rule. We show the impact on proposer and responder behavior 
from varying the number of bargaining periods, the number of responders, the cost of delay, and 
beliefs regarding responder behavior. 
For multi-period bargaining environments, we characterize the conditions under which a 
pooling equilibrium exists, in which the proposer expects both strategic types and high MAO 
sincere types to reject initial offers.  That is, in a pooling equilibrium, strategic types are 
expected to holdout for offers that yield a higher expected payoff. We also characterize the 
conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists, in which the proposer expects strategic 
types to accept initial offers, leaving only high MAO sincere types to receive subsequent offers. 
In a separating equilibrium, strategic types prefer the payoff from early offers to later offers and, 
therefore, do not holdout. We show that, in general, a pooling equilibrium with holdout is more 
likely to occur when delay costs are low and when a small percentage of the population is 
expected to be sincere types. A separating equilibrium exists when delay costs are high and when 
a large percentage of the population are sincere types. For a range of delay costs and proportion 
of sincere types, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. 
The model also demonstrates that proposers will take a more aggressive bargaining stance 
in multi-period bargaining environments compared to single-period environments. A general 
feature of our results is that in equilibrium, proposers utilize the opportunity to make multiple 
offers to partition the space over which MAO’s are distributed; this leads to fewer failed 
exchanges and higher expected payoffs for the proposers (holding constant the number of 
sellers). We show that an increase in the number of sellers leads the buyer to offer each seller a 






payoff.  Similarly, increasing the number of sellers leads to larger joint demands of the surplus 
by sellers. Increasing the number of sellers also decreases the probability of a successful 
exchange.  Thus, in theory, it is clear that a buyer should prefer to negotiate with a fewer (larger) 
sellers rather than with multiple (smaller) sellers. Moreover, whether the buyer or sellers are 
assigned the role of the proposer does not influence the equilibrium division of surplus or 
probability of exchange. 
The results of the model are evaluated using data from previous laboratory experiments. 
Our model predicts the pattern of rising offers and falling demands observed in the experimental 
data for multiple-period treatments, indicating that proposers believe that at least some 
responders are sincere MAO types. The model also predicts that delay costs will increase offers, 
in general, when some responders are assumed to respond sincerely. This means higher delay 
costs should also increase the likelihood of exchange, ceteris paribus. The model predicts that 
offers and demands would remain unchanged over time if proposers believed that all responders 
respond strategically. The laboratory data are consistent with these predictions. 
Analysis of responder decisions shows the probability of accepting a given offer or 
demand is lower when delay is costless and in the first periods of multi-period bargaining 
treatments compared to single-period treatments, indicating that at least some responders behave 
strategically. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the 
behavioral bargaining model and equilibrium predictions. Section 3 describes the experimental 
setting. The behavioral predictions of the model are evaluated in section 4 using data from 
laboratory experiments. Section 5 contains concluding remarks. An Appendix presents numerical 







2.  Behavioral Multilateral Bargaining Model 
  Following Menezes and Pitchford (2004b) and Miceli and Segerson (2007), consider a 
simple model in which a single agent (the “buyer”) wishes to purchase N complementary units of 
a good from N other independent agents (the “sellers”). The units can be interpreted as 
intermediate inputs into the production of a large project. Each seller i has one unit for sale and 
incurs a cost ci for this unit. The value of the project to the buyer is V if N input units can be 
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where pi is the price paid for unit i, and each seller i receives a payoff  (pi - ci). Assume that all 
contracts are contingent such that no sales occur (and, therefore, all parties receive a payoff of 
zero) if any of the required input units are not purchased. Bargaining takes place between the 
buyer and the sellers over one or more periods. Delay may be costly such that future payoffs are 
discounted according to a one-period discount rate  . 
    For simplicity, normalize the buyer’s value to V = 1 throughout the following analysis so 
that offers can be framed as shares of the bargaining surplus. Assume sellers’ each have a 
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) ( where N is the total number of sellers. 
Therefore, a non-negative economic surplus is always generated from the transfer of all sellers’ 
units to the buyer, regardless of the number of sellers. Furthermore, by assuming MAOs are 
distributed from 0 to an upper limit of 1/N the expected surplus is held constant as the number of 
sellers increases.
1 That is, multiple small sellers are no more “greedy” than a single large seller. 
Alternatively, the expected cost of multiple small sellers is no greater than the expected cost of a 
single large seller. It should be noted that all of the following analysis could be generalized to 
other distributions of MAOs. The uniform distribution and parameters used here are chosen for 
simplicity and tractability only. 
    The MAO’s may be interpreted as unknown sellers’ costs, as in Shupp et al. (2009). 
Alternatively, in an environment with complete information about the buyer’s value and sellers’ 
costs (as in Cadigan et al. (2009a, 2009b)), MAOs may be interpreted as arising from 
heterogeneous preferences for fairness (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000)) where the MAO is the offer level above which the responder would receive positive net 
utility, and below which responder utility from accepting would be negative. Finally, MAOs may 
arise as the result of satisficing behavior on the part of responders (Simon 1955, 1959). Of 
course, MAOs may arise as a combination of factors. The primary concern of the current study is 
                                                           
1 The distribution of sellers’ MAOs from 0 to 1/N has intuitive appeal if MAOs are interpreted as arising from 
satisficing behavior or reservation prices arising from unknown sellers’ costs. However, if MAOs are interpreted as 
arising from heterogeneous preferences for fairness, then a distribution of MAOs from 0 to 1/(N+1) may be more 
appealing, as 1/(N+1) indicates a strictly egalitarian division of the surplus. The actual distribution of MAOs does 






not the origin of MAOs, but rather their impact on the bargaining behavior of proposers and 
responders. 
    A model that includes all variables of interest simultaneously (e.g. number of sellers, 
number of periods, delay costs, and proportion of strategic versus sincere responders) is not 
tractable. Therefore, we begin our analysis with the simplified single-period case where a buyer 
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to N sellers, or N sellers each make a take-it-or-leave-it demand 
from the buyer. We show how offers and demands change as the number of sellers changes, 
ceteris paribus. Next, we characterize the solution for the case of one buyer and one seller in 
which the buyer can make offers in each of T periods, with the seller responding sincerely 
according to an MAO in each period, and delay is costless. We then examine a two-period, one-
seller model in which responders may respond either sincerely in the first period (e.g. accept any 
offers that exceed their MAO) or strategically (e.g. reject first-period offers in favor of a higher 
expected offer in period 2). In this section we show how first- and second-period offers compare 
to the optimal single-period offer. We also demonstrate how an increase in the cost of delay or 
the proportion of sincere types affects equilibrium offers and the behavior of strategic 
responders. Finally, we present a two-period, two-seller model for generality. 
2.1 Single-period bargaining  
  Buyer offers to N sellers 
   Let the buyer be the proposer with sellers deciding to accept or reject the buyer’s offer 
according to the MAO rule.
2 Given the known distribution of MAOs, the buyer makes symmetric 
offers b to the sellers that maximize the buyer’s expected payoff. Each seller accepts the offer if  
                                                           
2 Because there is only a single period, responding sincerely according to the MAO rule is a dominant strategy. 







i x b  . The probability that seller i accepts an offer of b is  Nb N b b x P i    ) / 1 /( ) ( . Because 
each of the N sellers must accept the offer for an exchange to be realized, the probability the 
buyer receives the associated payoff of  ) 1 ( Nb   is 
N Nb) ( . Therefore, the buyer solves 
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We summarize these results as Result 1. 
Result 1: As the number of sellers N increases, the buyer’s optimal offer to each seller decreases, 
the sum of the shares offered to sellers increases, the probability of a successful exchange 
decreases, and the buyer’s expected payoff decreases. 
 
 
   N sellers demands on a single buyer 
    Alternatively, consider the case where N sellers each make a single take-it-or-leave-it 
demand di on a buyer. Similar to the case above, assume the buyer has an MAO that is private 
information drawn from the publicly known uniform distribution    1 , 0 U ~ i x .
3 The buyer accepts 
                                                           
3 Again, the buyer’s MAO may be interpreted as unknown project valuation, as in Eckart (1985), Strange (1995), 
and Shupp et al. (2009). Alternatively, the buyer’s MAO may arise from heterogeneous preferences for fairness or 













i 1 . The probability that the buyer accepts the sellers’ 
joint demands is   
 
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1 ) 1 ( ( . Sellers make simultaneous demands and choose 
demands non-cooperatively. Seller i chooses di to solve  
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Assuming a symmetric equilibrium in sellers’ demands, the equilibrium individual seller’s 








di .           ( 8 )  








Ndi   .          ( 9 )  
Notice that the sellers’ equilibrium individual and joint demands are identical to equilibrium 
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We summarize these results as Result 2. 
Result 2: As the number of sellers N increases, the individual seller’s equilibrium demand from 
the buyer decreases, the sellers’ joint demand on the buyer increases, and the probability of a 
successful exchange decreases. 
 
The intuition behind Result 2 is that sellers face a Cournot-like problem with respect to demands. 
In setting his demand, each seller ignores the externality imposed on other sellers as he raises his 






to the case when sellers cooperate in their demand decisions. It is straightforward to show that 
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and that  
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cooperate
i d d          ( 1 2 )  
whenever there are multiple sellers. 
    In each of the cases above, we examine the impact of increasing the number of sellers 
when proposers make a single ultimatum offer or demand. In the field, bargainers typically have 
multiple opportunities to make and receive proposals. Rejected proposals may impose 
transactions costs or delay costs on one or both bargaining parties, but rejected proposals may 
also convey information to the proposer about the responder’s willingness to accept a given 
offer. In the following subsection we consider the possibility that proposers have more than one 
opportunity to reach an agreement with responders. To focus the analysis on the impact of 
adding additional bargaining periods, we consider first the simplified case of a buyer who can 
make an offer to a single seller in each of T periods, and delay is costless.
4 The seller is assumed 
to respond sincerely according to an MAO. 
2.2 Multiple-period bargaining with a sincere seller 
    Consider the case of a single buyer who can make one offer in each of T periods to a 
sincere seller whose MAO is a draw from a uniform distribution over the unit interval. If the 
                                                           
4 We do not consider the interesting case of alternating offers or other bargaining institutions.  These are examined 






buyer’s offer in period (T-1) is rejected, then the buyer’s updated beliefs about the seller’s MAO 
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In period T, the buyer solves: 
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In period (T-1) the buyer solves 
))
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Note that the first term on the right hand side of each period’s optimal offer expression is the 
lower bound for i x  ; this is 0 in period 1. The basic intuition here is that a rejection in period t 
leads the buyer to update beliefs regarding the lower bound on the MAO distribution.  In period 
(t+1) the buyer adds a fraction of the updated distribution to the period t offer, where the fraction 
depends on the number of remaining periods (in the last period the buyer updates the offer by 
adding 1/2 of the remaining distribution; in T-1, the buyer offers 1/3 of the remaining 
distribution, etc.). Substituting the formula for b1* into the formula for b2*, and similar recursive 









  .           ( 1 8 )
 
Result 3: In the T period case with one buyer and one sincere seller the buyer’s optimal offer in 
period t is t/(T+1).  The path of buyer offers is increasing; the buyer begins with an offer of 
1/(T+1) and increases the offer by 1/(T+1) in each period.  The probability of a successful 
exchange is T/(T+1), which is increasing in T.  For sufficiently large T, the buyer’s surplus 
approaches 1-  i x  
    
    Result 3 illustrates the strategic advantage conveyed to a buyer who can make multiple 
offers to a sincere seller.  Given the opportunity to make T offers, the buyer effectively partitions 
the MAO distribution into T sections.  As T gets large, the buyer is able to start with a very low 
offer and increment it by small amounts in successive periods.  In the limit, the buyer is able to 






    As there are multiple periods in this case, it may be appropriate to introduce discounting 
of buyer and seller payoffs by the single period discount factor δ. Importantly, the basic intuiton 
behind Result 3 is not affected by including a discount rate, in the sense that the buyer still 
partitions the MAO distribution and offers a finer partition the greater is the number of periods.  
Yet the presence of a discount rate (1-δ) does affect the starting offer (and subsequent offers) in a 
straightforward manner.  Because there is a cost to failing to reach an agreement in the current 
period, the optimal buyer offer path lies to the right of the path without discounting.  For 
example, when T = 3 and there is no discounting, the optimal offer path is {¼, ½, ¾}.  With 
discounting, the optimal path of offers is {¼ + δ/(2(1+δ)); ½ + δ/(2(1+δ)); ¾ +δ/(4(1+δ))}.  In 
the extreme case when δ = 1, we have a one-period game, and the optimal single-period offer 
with one seller is ½, consistent with our results in section 2.1. 
    Results 1-3 utilize the assumption that responders are sincere. This assumption leads to a 
substantive departure from the standard game theoretic prediction (not affected by multiple 
bargaining periods or the imposition of delay costs) that proposers offer, and responders accept, 
the smallest allowable share of the bargaining pie.
6 We note that the standard game theoretic 
prediction is not consistent with conventional wisdom and observed bargaining behavior. 
Instead, proposers appear to take more aggressive bargaining stances (i.e. make lower offers or 
higher demands) in the early periods of multi-offer bargaining environments both with and 
without delay costs, and follow rejected offers or demands with higher offers and lower demands 
                                                           
6 This result holds if delay costs are symmetric. If delay costs are asymmetric such that the proposer (e.g. the 
developer) faces positive delay costs, but the responder (e.g. the landowner) faces no delay cost, the proposer should 
offer Tε in the first period, where T is the total number of periods and ε is the smallest unit of account. The 
responder should accept in the first period. This is because the responder would be indifferent between accepting ε 
in period 1 versus period T, so rejecting ε in every period but the last is a best response. If the proposer faces a 
positive delay cost, the proposer’s best response in period T-1 is to offer ε+ε so that the responder accepts earlier. 






(Cadigan et al. 2009a).  While our modeling approach leads to equilibrium predictions that fit the 
experimental data quite well, we recognize that the assumption that all responders are sincere is 
particularly strong in the multi-period case, where the equilibrium path of offers is increasing.   
    In fact, one of our main points is that when faced with such a bargaining environment, 
some responders may choose to strategically ‘holdout’ for better offers.  Whereas the sincere 
responders considered thus far are assumed to follow a simple decision rule based on MAOs, 
strategic responders are assumed to consciously predict an expected path of offers, and wait for 
the offer that maximizes their payoff. This rationale for holdout does not rely on the assumption 
of incomplete information or the ability to delay entering into negotiation with a buyer.  Note, 
however, that when all responders behave strategically, a rejection in period t does not contain 
any information about a seller’s MAO. And if proposers do not believe that a responder’s 
decision conveys credible information about a responder’s type (e.g. the responder is behaving 
strategically), then the proposer’s optimal subsequent proposals would be unaffected by a 
rejection. Thus, for holdout of this type to occur in equilibrium there must be a mix of sincere 
and strategic responders. We formalize these explanations in the context of a general two-period, 
one-seller model with costly delay where the seller can behave either sincerely or strategically.  
2.3 Multi-period bargaining with costly delay: Buyer offers to one seller 
    Assume that all sellers are one of two types: sincere or strategic. Define a sincere seller 
as one who accepts an offer if the offer exceeds the seller’s MAO. A strategic seller accepts an 
offer only if it yields a payoff at least as high as the payoff yielded by any other expected offer. 






payoff, while sincere responders do not. Strategic sellers have no MAO.
7 Our assumptions 
regarding minimum acceptable offers are consistent, in general, with data from laboratory 
experiments. For example, in an ultimatum game with a $15 pie where responders were forced to 
indicate a binding minimum acceptable offer, Schmitt et al. (2008) report that one-fourth of all 
responders committed to accepting offers of $0.01 or less. 
    For simplicity, consider the case where there is a single buyer and a single seller, and the 
buyer can make a second-period offer if his first-period offer is rejected. The payoffs of the 
buyer and the seller are both discounted at a one-period discount rate  . Strategic sellers are 
assumed to make their decision in period 1 based on the period-one offer and the discounted 
expected payoff from accepting in period 2. Sincere sellers accept the first offer that exceeds 
their MAO. That is, MAOs are minimum acceptable offers and not minimum acceptable payoffs. 
Therefore, MAOs are not affected by the discount rate.
8  
    In the one-seller case, we assume that the MAO for a sincere seller is distributed 
uniformly from 0 to 1.  If the buyer’s first-period offer is rejected, and the buyer believes the 
seller is responding sincerely, then the buyer’s updated beliefs about the seller’s MAO and the 
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7 We assume strategic sellers have no MAO for simplicity. Alternatively, one could assume that all sellers have an 
MAO, but that some respond sincerely and some respond strategically subject to this MAO. While more complex, 
we do not believe that this possibility would qualitatively change the results of the model. 
8 This avoids the added complication of adjusting MAOs for the discount factor, which would imply that second 
period MAOs = first period MAOs / (1 -  ). Alternatively, one could assume that sincere sellers do not discount. 
For simplicity, we assume that sincere sellers care only about the nominal offer relative to their MAO. 






If the buyer believes the seller is responding strategically, the probability that the second period 
offer is accepted is 1. Let λ be the proportion of the population that the buyer believes are 
sincere, and (1 – λ) be the proportion that are believed to be strategic. We first derive the 
necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium, whereby strategic types accept the first-period 
offer and only sincere types receive a second-period offer. We then derive a pooling equilibrium, 
whereby both strategic and sincere types receive a second-period offer. Lastly, we characterize 
the parameter values of λ and δ that are consistent with a pooling or separating equilibrium. For 
some values of λ and δ, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. 
    What are the buyer’s optimal period 1 and period 2 offers, assuming λ and δ are publicly 
known? What is the strategic seller’s optimal response to a buyer’s first-period offer? Suppose 
strategic sellers believe the payoff from accepting in period 1 exceeds the discounted expected 
payoff from accepting in period 2. That is, in considering b1 the seller believes b1 ≥ (1- δ)b2. The 
strategic seller would accept b1. Only sincere types with an MAO exceeding b1 would reject b1. 
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which yields the optimal second period offer of 
   .           ( 2 1 )  
    In period 1, the buyer sets b1 assuming that strategic types would accept b1, and only 
sincere types with MAOs in excess of b1 would reject. The buyer solves 
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Therefore, 
     .          ( 2 4 )  
Note that b1* must be non-negative. Therefore, an interior solution exists only if   
which implies a lower limit of λ = 0.5 for the proportion of sincere types because δ can be no 
larger than 1. Notice that   for any interior solution. In general, both   are 
increasing in both λ and δ for any interior solutions.  Furthermore, for strategic sellers to prefer 
 we must have  . This requires,  .
10 Therefore, a separating 
equilibrium cannot exist either for small delay costs or for a small proportion of sincere types. 
The intuition is that if δ is sufficiently small, strategic sellers will tend to prefer the larger period 
2 offer to the period 1 offer, even if the period 2 offer is discounted. Therefore, the buyer will not 
be able to entice such sellers into accepting a period 1 offer. Strategic sellers will holdout if they 
face sufficiently low delay costs. Similarly, if λ is too small (indicating most types are strategic), 
the buyer offers very little in the first period (even b1* = 0 for λ < 0.5) because strategic types 
are assumed to accept, so it will not be incentive compatible for strategic types to actually accept 
b1*. Therefore, we must have both high δ and high λ for the strategic seller’s incentive 
compatibility constraint to be met. 
                                                           
10 That is, it can be shown that if δ < 0.41, then the discounted b2 will be preferred to b1 regardless of the value of λ. 






    If in the second period the buyer believes that strategic types have rejected the first period 
offer, the buyer expects that all strategic types will accept the second period offer along with 
some sincere types. The buyer solves 
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which yields the optimal second period offer 
   .         ( 2 6 )  
    In period 1, the buyer sets b1 assuming that both strategic types and sincere types with 
MAOs in excess of b1 would reject b1. The buyer solves 
    ) ( 1 ) 1 ( )
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        (27) 
which yields 
   .    
 (28) 
Therefore, 
     
 (29) 
    The following observations can be made based on the results in (23) - (29): 
Result 4: In two-period bargaining, if all responders are sincere (λ = 1), then we have  






In the simplest case when all types are thought to be sincere, Result 4 indicates that the optimal 
path of offers will be rising (b2* > b1*) and both period offers are positively related to the cost of 
delay ( ). 
Result 5: In two-period bargaining, if all responders are strategic (λ = 0), then we have  
  .  
If all responders are strategic, we have corner solutions for  . Result 5 is the familiar 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium when all responders are payoff maximizers. 
    The most interesting as well as complex case arises when the buyer is facing a mix of 
sincere and strategic types such that 0 < λ < 1. What parameter values of λ and δ, if any, lead to 
the separating equilibrium characterized by (23) and (24), and what values, if any, yield the 
pooling equilibrium of (28) and (29), which may include the corner solutions 
?  
    For a separating equilibrium to exist, strategic sellers must prefer the period 1 offer to the 
discounted period 2 offer, so we must have 
            ( 3 0 )  
and the buyer must prefer the expected payoff from this separating equilibrium to the pooling 
equilibrium expected payoff. 
    Tables A1 – A4 in the Appendix give the equilibrium values of b1* and b2* from 
equations (23) – (28) for various values of λ and δ. Columns 2 – 4 in the tables show the optimal 
first and second-period offers from the pooling equilibrium calculations, as well as the 
discounted seller payoff from the second period offer. Columns 6 – 8 show these same values for 






highlighted in blue. Outcomes consistent with a separating equilibrium are highlighted in yellow. 
Columns 9 and 10 show the buyer’s expected payoff when an equilibrium exists. 
    Table 1 summarizes these results and indicates which values lead to a separating 
equilibrium, which values lead to a pooling equilibrium, and which values lead to no pure 
strategy equilibrium. 
 
    Table 1 indicates that a pooling equilibrium exists for low-value combinations of both λ 
and δ. A separating equilibrium exists for high-value combinations of both λ and δ. For some of 
high δ and low λ, no equilibrium exists. We formalize these observations as  
Result 6: When there are both sincere and strategic responder types and delay costs are low, a 
pooling equilibrium exists in which strategic sellers holdout. When delay costs are high and a 
large proportion of sellers are assumed to be sincere, a separating equilibrium exists in which 
strategic types do not holdout, and only high MAO sincere types reject initial offers.  
 
The intuition behind Result 6 is that when delay costs are sufficiently low, strategic responders 
will always tend to prefer later offers to earlier offers, because optimal offers rise over time as 
long as some responders are assumed to be sincere. The larger the proportion of sincere 
responders, the more strategic responders benefit from this rise in offers. Only a combination of 
sufficiently high delay costs and proportion of sincere responders will lead buyers to make first-
period offers that are preferred to discounted second-period offers by strategic sellers. 
2.3 Multi-period bargaining with costly delay: Buyer offers to two sellers 






, 0 U ~ i x  gives the sellers’ MAO. For 
simplicity, we assume all sellers are sincere. If the buyer’s first-period offer is rejected, and the 






updated beliefs about the seller’s MAO and the probability that a second period offer b2 will be 
accepted
11 is  
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To solve the model we must backward induct starting in the second period. For there to be a 
second period offer, one or both sellers must have rejected the first period offer. When the buyer 
makes offers to multiple sellers in a given period (e.g. offers to both sellers in period 1 or offers 
to both sellers in period 2), we assume the buyer makes identical offers to all sellers. 
    Consider the case where both sellers have rejected the buyer’s first period offer b1 and the 
buyer makes symmetric period 2 offers to both sellers. We assume a symmetric delay cost such 
that the payoff of the buyer and both sellers is reduced by δ/2 for each period 1 rejection. This is 
the convention used in Cadigan et al (2009a). Alternatively, one could assume a “weakest link” 
delay cost in which all payoffs are reduced by δ if bargaining continues to the second period, 
regardless if one seller accepted in period 1. In the modeling, we follow the Cadigan, et al 
(2009a) approach, although we present numerical results for both approaches. We show that for 
δ < 1, the approaches are qualitatively the same. The latter is simply a more severe delay cost 
treatment than the former. 
    If both sellers rejected b1, the buyer’s period 2 payoff from offering b1 to each seller is 
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Let   be the optimal second period offer to two sellers. Solving (12) yields  
                                                           






   .           ( 3 3 )  
If only one seller has rejected the first period offer, the buyer solves
12 
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          (34)   
This yields an optimal offer to the one remaining seller of
 
             ( 3 5 )  
    In the first period, the buyer considers the expected payoff in the second period from the 
two possibilities above, and solves 
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Given the optimal second period offers in (25) and (27), solving (28) yields the optimal first 
offer 
  
       
 (37) 
For illustration purposes, Table 2 shows the optimal first and second period offers for various 
delay costs. The table provides comparison between the single-period, two-seller case and the 
two different two-period, two-seller cases with alternative delay cost treatments. 
    Several important results are evident from the model results and numerical results in 
Table 2. 
                                                           
12 In the weakest link delay cost case, the buyer’s problem here would be  )
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Result 7: The optimal first period offer in a two-period bargaining game with sincere sellers is 
less than the optimal second period offer. 
 
Result 7 again indicates that the optimal path of offers will be rising. 
 
Result 8: The optimal first period offer in a two-period bargaining game with sincere sellers is 
less than the optimal offer in a one-period game, while the optimal second period offer is greater. 
 
The exception to Result 8 is the case in the rightmost column of Table 2. If the delay cost is one 
and is of the “weakest link” form, then any single rejection effectively reduces the buyer’s payoff 
to zero. Therefore, the game is essentially a one-period game, and the optimal first period offer 
coincides with the optimal offer in the single-period case. This is not true for the delay cost 
treatment of Cadigan, et al (2009a) in which only rejection by both sellers in period 1 reduces the 
buyer’s payoff to zero when δ = 1. 
Result 9: In the two-period game with sincere sellers, the optimal first period offer   and 
optimal second period offer to both sellers   are both increasing in the cost of delay. 
 
    Finally, compare the optimal first and second-period offers in the two-period, two-seller 
case to the optimal offers in the two-period, one-seller case with only sincere types (the λ = 1 
rows in Tables A1 – A4). Consistent with the N-seller single-period bargaining model in 
subsection 2.1, the optimal first and second-period offers to two sellers are less than the optimal 
offers to one seller, but the joint offer is higher. 
 
3.  The Experiment 
There are a total of ten treatments. In six treatments, the buyer makes offers to sellers. In 
four treatments, the sellers make demands on a buyer. The six buyer-offer treatments are: (1) 
single-period offer to one seller, (2) ten-period offers to one seller with no delay cost, (3) single-






period offer to two sellers with a 10% delay cost (δ = 0.10), and (6) ten-period offers to fours 
sellers with a 10% delay cost (δ = 0.10). 
The four seller-demand treatments are identical to the buyer offer treatments (3) – (6) 
except that the sellers make demands on the buyer. All treatments are conducted using z-Tree 
software (Fischbacher 2007). Unlike in the Gneezy, et al (2003) experiments, proposers in our 
experiment are not constrained to increase their offers (or reduce their demands) upon a 
rejection. 
Valuations and costs are common knowledge. The buyer’s valuation is V =$ 90. In the 
one-seller treatments, the seller’s cost is c = $ 60. In the two-seller treatments, sellers’ costs are 
symmetric such that c1 = c2 = $ 30. In the four-seller treatments, sellers’ costs are symmetric 
such that c1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = $ 15. This results in an economic surplus of $30 in every treatment 
that may be divided between the participants. Once a seller accepts an offer from the buyer, or 
has a demand accepted by the buyer, that seller makes no additional decisions. Sellers do not 
observe offers or demands made for other sellers’ units, but are informed of the amount of any 
accepted offer or demand. Subjects are informed of their experimental earnings plus a $10 show-
up fee and paid privately, in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Subjects for all of the one and two-seller treatments were undergraduate volunteers at 
Gettysburg College. Subjects for the four-seller treatments were undergraduate volunteers at 
Michigan State University. Subjects participated anonymously via computer. There were 931 
subjects who participated for a total of about 30 bargaining groups per treatment. 
 






Table 3 presents offer and earnings results from the six buyer-offer treatments. The table 
gives the mean first-period offer and joint offer, as well as the mean real final payoff for buyers 
and sellers. Real payoffs are adjusted for any delay costs.  
Table 4 presents demand and earnings results from the four seller-demand treatments. 
The table gives the mean first-period demand and joint demand, as well as the mean real final 
payoff for buyers and sellers.  
Tables 5 and 6 present the delay and efficiency results for the buyer-offer and seller-demand 
treatments, respectively. Delay is represented by the average agreement period, and efficiency is 
calculated as actual group earnings (after delay costs) divided by maximum possible group earnings ($30 
per group in all treatments). 
   The experimental results are consistent with the model’s results (Results 1 – 9 from section 2) in 
almost every case, and where differences are predicted between treatments, the differences are both 
meaningfully large and typically statistically significant in the hypothesized direction (using standard 
non-parametric tests
13). For brevity, we leave out the details of every statistical test and summarize the 
main findings. We note only where differences in the results are not statistically significant at standard 
levels. 
    First, how does increasing the number of sellers impact offers, demands, and the likelihood of 
exchange, ceteris paribus? From table 3, the buyer makes lower individual offers to two sellers ($6.62 in 
one-period treatment / $4.28 in ten-period, costless delay treatment) compared to one seller ($11.72 in 
one-period treatment / $5.58 in ten-period treatment), but the buyer’s joint offer is higher with two sellers 
($13.24 versus $11.72 in one-period treatments; $8.56 versus $5.58 in the ten-period treatments)
14. The 
                                                           
13 Mann-Whitney test. 
14 The difference in individual first-period offers in the ten-period treatments ($5.58 versus $4.28) is not statistically 
significant (significance level = 0.443), but the difference in joint offers is statistically significant. However, the 
difference in first-period offers in the one-period treatments is statistically significant, but the difference in joint 






buyer also makes lower first-period offers to four sellers ($3.54), compared to two ($5.82) in the 
otherwise identical treatment, but the joint offer to four sellers is higher. From table 5, there are three 
times as many failed agreements in the single-period treatment with two sellers compared to the same 
treatment with one seller. The buyer’s final payoff is also unambiguously lower with two compared to 
one sellers, and with four sellers compared to two sellers. 
    Similarly, from table 4 four, sellers each demand less initially from the buyer when there are two 
sellers ($14.17) compared to four ($10.91), but their joint demand is much higher with four ($43.64) than 
with two ($28.34). There were four failed agreements with four sellers (out of 28) and 0 (out of 30) with 
two sellers in an otherwise identical ten-period, costly delay treatment. The buyer also had lower final 
earnings with four sellers ($5.30) compared to two ($9.39). 
    The model in section 2 provides no clear prediction about how the extent of bargaining delay 
should be affected by the number of bargainers. From the data, there is little evidence that increasing the 
number of bargainers increases bargaining delay. From table 5, the average agreement period with one 
seller (7.39) is actually higher than in the equivalent treatment with two sellers (6.40), though the 
difference in delay is not statistically significant
15. However, the average agreement period with costly 
delay and two sellers (2.47) was slightly lower than with four sellers (2.98)
16. From table 6, when sellers 
made demands the average agreement period was similarly higher with four sellers (3.05) compared to 
two sellers (2.67), though the difference is not statistically significant in the seller-demand case. 
    How does increasing the number of bargaining periods affect offers, demands, and the likelihood 
of agreement? Remarkably, there is a very high rate of agreement in the ten-period bargaining treatments 
in general compared to the single-period treatments, with only one total failed agreement in the multi-
period treatments with one or two sellers (out of 181 groups), and six failed agreements (out of 57) in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
0.247). Note that the model would predict very low initial offers when there are ten bargaining periods both with one 
and with two sellers, so the lack of a statistically significant difference in initial offers here should not be surprising. 
The difference should be, and is, more pronounced in the one-period treatments, as the model predicts.  
15 Using Mann-Whitney Test, two-tailed significance level = 0.330. 






multi-period treatments with four sellers. This high rate of agreement occurred despite the fact that 
bargainers in every case took a more aggressive bargaining stance in the multi-period treatments 
compared to the single-period treatments. For example, buyers offered $11.72 on average to sellers in the 
one-period, single seller treatment, compared to $5.58 in the first period of the ten-period treatment (with 
no cost to delay). Similarly, buyers offered two sellers $6.62 on average in the single-period treatment 
versus $4.28 in the ten-period treatment without costly delay, and $5.82 in the ten-period treatment with 
costly delay. Sellers demanded an average of $11.66 from the buyer in the one-period two-seller 
treatment, versus $16.73 in the ten-period treatment without delay costs and $14.17 with delay costs.  
    From tables 5 and 6 there is a correspondingly high rate of rejection of first period offers and 
demands in the multi-period treatments. However, the high ultimate agreement rate, consistent with the 
model predictions, occurred because offers rose and demands fell significantly over time, as indicated by 
final responder payoffs compared to first period offers and demands, such that any MAOs were likely to 
be met. 
   How do delay costs affect offers, demands, and the likelihood of exchange? From table 3 we see 
that buyers’ first-period offers to two sellers with delay costs ($5.82) were higher on average than when 
delay was costless ($4.28). Similarly, from table 4, sellers demanded less in the first period when delay 
was costly ($14.17) compared to when delay was costless ($16.73). Both of these differences in first-
period offers and demands are statistically significant. In the ten-period treatments, there were almost no 
failed agreements either with or without delay costs. However, we see from the average agreement period 
data in tables 5 and 6 that delay costs appear to significantly increase the speed of agreement. For 
example, the average agreement period in the buyer-offer treatment with two sellers was 6.4 when delay 
was costless, but 2.47 when delay was costly. Similarly, the average agreement period when two sellers 







    What do the results imply about strategic versus sincere responder behavior? First, the fact that 
buyers offer a significant amount of the surplus in the single-period treatments indicates an expectation 
that sellers have MAOs. Otherwise, the buyer would offer the smallest amount possible ($0.01 in the 
experiments). We can further infer from the fact that buyer’s offers fall and seller’s demands rise in the 
first period of the ten-period treatments that (at least many) buyers and sellers are attempting to payoff 
maximize and that the first-period offers and demands in the single-period treatments were not made 
primarily out of concerns for equity or some other motivation. This is consistent with the model’s 
assumptions about proposer behavior. We also observe that offers tend to rise following a rejection, and 
demands fall, indicating that proposers believe that rejections offer credible information about a 
responder’s MAO. Otherwise, if proposers believed that all responders were behaving strategically, offers 
and demands should not change.  
    Lastly, we can analyze responder behavior to investigate whether responders behave sincerely or 
strategically. Table 7 presents the probit results from a regression of sellers’ first-period responses to 
offers (column 1) and buyers’ first-period responses to demands (column 2).
17 In each case, the dependent 
variable is the response (1 = Accept) and the independent variables are the offer or demand, period, and 
dummy variables indicating number of periods (1 = single period) and cost of delay (1 = costly delay). 
The tables give the marginal effects in each case. For these regressions we pooled and analyzed the two-
seller treatments only. 
    From table 7 we see that a seller’s probability of accepting an offer is positively related to the 
offer. The probability of accepting a given offer is also higher in single-period compared to multi-period 
treatments, and is higher when there are positive delay costs. Table 7 indicates very similar behavior by 
buyers. Taken together, these results indicate that some responders behave strategically. They reject some 
offers when there are multiple bargaining periods, particularly when delay costs are low. This is 
consistent with the predictions of the model which indicate that strategic holdout is most likely to occur 
                                                           






when delay costs are low, and provided proposers believe that some responders behave sincerely 
according to an MAO so that offers rise and demands fall over time. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
  This paper has presented a behavioral bargaining model that is far better than previous 
models at explaining proposer and responder behavior in multi-period unanimous-consent 
bargaining problems. While the standard model assumes payoff-maximizing behavior by all 
subjects, the present model allows some subjects to behave as payoff maximizers and others to 
behave sincerely according to a minimum-acceptable-offer rule. This leads to rich set of 
equilibrium predictions in which proposals and responses are driven by the number of bargaining 
parties, the number of bargaining periods, and the cost of delay. The model’s predictions are 
highly consistent with data from laboratory bargaining experiments. Strategic responders holdout 
for higher offers (or lower demands) by proposers, and proposers in turn make increasing offers 
(or decreasing demands) because they expect some responders to behave sincerely according to a 
minimum acceptable offer. 
  Two important implications of the theoretical and empirical results are that land-
assemblers are likely to prefer bargaining with fewer land owners, when possible. This may lead 
developers to seek out consolidated land, even if the potential surplus from such a project is 
likely to be less than a similar project where land is more fragmented. Furthermore, achieving 
unanimous-consent is likely to involve substantial delay as some responders are likely to predict, 
and holdout for, higher offers (or lower demands) in later bargaining periods. This pattern of 
rising offers or falling demands is only possible if proposers believe that some responders have a 






  Our results also provide some empirical support for the Olson (1982) hypothesis that 
achieving unanimous-consent within distributional coalitions is likely to involve significant 
delay, which will “slow down a society’s capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate 
resources in response to changing conditions” (p. 65). Based on our laboratory results, there is 
strong evidence that the extent of delay is inversely related to the cost of delay, but weak 







Table 1. Equilibrium characteristics 
  δ                
λ  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9 
0  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
0.1  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  
0.2  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling    
0.3  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling     
0.4  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling      
0.5  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling      
0.6  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling     Separating  Separating 
0.7  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling     Separating  Separating  Separating 
0.8  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling   Separating  Separating  Separating  Separating 
0.9  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Pooling  Separating  Separating  Separating  Separating  Separating 
1  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
 


















        
δ = 1  δ = 0  δ = 0.5  δ = 1  δ = 0  δ = 0.5  δ = 1 
        
     
       
         
        
        
A  = Cadigan et al (2009a, 2009b) delay cost of δ/2 for each rejection of b1 
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$3.54    
(1.64) 
$14.16  $7.24 
(4.27) 
$3.85   
(1.73) 
 
N = 29 
 



































































$10.91    
(9.68) 
$43.64  $5.30    
(4.16) 
$3.96    
(2.80) 
$15.84  








Table 5. Holdout and efficiency results by buyer-offer treatment (standard deviations in parentheses) 
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Table 6. Holdout and efficiency results by seller-demand treatment (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 













































































Table 7. Probit regression results for responders’ first-period decisions in the two-seller treatments 

























2 =  0.388 0.583 
Prob > χ
2 =   0.000 0.000 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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λ b1P b2P b2P(1‐δ)b 1 S b 2 S b 2 S ( 1 ‐δ)
0000 0 0 0 1 1
0.1 0 0.05 0.05 0 0.5 0.5 0.85975
0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.5 0.5 0.738
0.3 0 0.15 0.15 0 0.5 0.5 0.63325
0.4 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.5 0.5 0.544
0.5 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 0.5 0.46875
0.6 0 0.3 0.3 0 0.5 0.5 0.406
0.7 0.108152 0.420299 0.420299 0.047619 0.523809524 0.523809524 0.359537291
0.8 0.21657 0.529942 0.529942 0.166667 0.583333333 0.583333333 0.337815116
0.9 0.286354 0.607495 0.607495 0.259259 0.62962963 0.62962963 0.331051287
1 0.333333 0.666667 0.666667 0.333333 0.666666667 0.666666667 0.333333333
δ =  0.1
Pooling equilibrium Separating equilibrium
λ b1P b2P b2P(1‐δ)b 1 S b 2 S b 2 S ( 1 ‐δ) Pooling PayoffSep Payoff
0000 0 0 0 0 . 9 1
0.1 0 0.05 0.045 0 0.5 0.45 0.773775
0.2 0 0.1 0.09 0 0.5 0.45 0.6642
0.3 0 0.15 0.135 0 0.5 0.45 0.569925
0.4 0 0.2 0.18 0 0.5 0.45 0.4896
0.5 0 0.25 0.225 0 0.5 0.45 0.421875
0.6 0.02017 0.314119 0.282707 0 0.5 0.45 0.365554907
0.7 0.165677 0.45769 0.411921 0.078341 0.539170507 0.485253456 0.331913314
0.8 0.255979 0.553587 0.498229 0.193548 0.596774194 0.537096774 0.318500567
0.9 0.31484 0.623162 0.560846 0.283154 0.641577061 0.577419355 0.316885872
1 0.354839 0.677419 0.609677 0.354839 0.677419355 0.609677419 0.322580645
δ =  0.2
λ b1P b2P b2P(1‐δ)b 1 S b 2 S b 2 S ( 1 ‐δ) Pooling PayoffSep Payoff
0000 0 0 0 0 . 8 1
0.1 0 0.05 0.04 0 0.5 0.4 0.6878
0.2 0 0.1 0.08 0 0.5 0.4 0.5904
0.3 0 0.15 0.12 0 0.5 0.4 0.5066
0.4 0 0.2 0.16 0 0.5 0.4 0.4352
0.5 0 0.25 0.2 0 0.5 0.4 0.375
0.6 0.099131 0.369392 0.295513 0 0.5 0.4 0.328781106
0.7 0.217515 0.491385 0.393108 0.107143 0.553571429 0.442857143 0.307133089
0.8 0.292111 0.575267 0.460213 0.21875 0.609375 0.4875 0.300824563
0.9 0.34129 0.63771 0.510168 0.305556 0.652777778 0.522222222 0.303737653
1 0.375 0.6875 0.55 0.375 0.6875 0.55 0.3125  
 








λ b1P b2P b2P(1‐δ) b1S b2S b2S(1‐δ) Pooling PayoffSep Payoff
0000 0 0 0 0 . 7 1
0.1 0 0.05 0.035 0 0.5 0.35 0.601825
0.2 0 0.1 0.07 0 0.5 0.35 0.5166
0.3 0 0.15 0.105 0 0.5 0.35 0.443275
0.4 0 0.2 0.14 0 0.5 0.35 0.3808
0.5 0.011628 0.258721 0.181105 0 0.5 0.35 0.328170422
0.6 0.169135 0.418394 0.292876 0 0.5 0.35 0.29648595
0.7 0.264469 0.521905 0.365334 0.134199 0.567099567 0.396969697 0.284794742
0.8 0.325358 0.595215 0.41665 0.242424 0.621212121 0.434848485 0.28459088
0.9 0.365917 0.651254 0.455878 0.326599 0.663299663 0.464309764 0.291501416
1 0.393939 0.69697 0.487879 0.393939 0.696969697 0.487878788 0.303030303
δ =  0.4
λ b1P b2P b2P(1‐δ) b1S b2S b2S(1‐δ) Pooling PayoffSep Payoff
0000 0 0 0 0 . 6 1
0.1 0 0.05 0.03 0 0.5 0.3 0.51585
0.2 0 0.1 0.06 0 0.5 0.3 0.4428
0.3 0 0.15 0.09 0 0.5 0.3 0.37995
0.4 0 0.2 0.12 0 0.5 0.3 0.3264
0.5 0.108696 0.331522 0.198913 0 0.5 0.3 0.285495924
0.6 0.231623 0.462136 0.277282 0.019608 0.509803922 0.305882353 0.26794826
0.7 0.307199 0.549679 0.329807 0.159664 0.579831933 0.34789916 0.264568714
0.8 0.356053 0.613632 0.368179 0.264706 0.632352941 0.379411765 0.269633425
0.9 0.388902 0.663896 0.398338 0.346405 0.673202614 0.403921569 0.280085972
1 0.411765 0.705882 0.423529 0.411765 0.705882353 0.423529412 0.294117647
δ =  0.5
λ b1P b2P b2P(1‐δ) b1S b2S b2S(1‐δ) Pooling PayoffSep Payoff
0000 0 0 0 0 . 5 1
0.1 0 0.05 0.025 0 0.5 0.25 0.429875
0.2 0 0.1 0.05 0 0.5 0.25 0.369
0.3 0 0.15 0.075 0 0.5 0.25 0.316625
0.4 0.032967 0.226374 0.113187 0 0.5 0.25 0.272316484
0.5 0.193878 0.395408 0.197704 0 0.5 0.25 0.248764349
0.6 0.287746 0.501422 0.250711 0.047619 0.523809524 0.261904762 0.24259381
0.7 0.346249 0.575062 0.287531 0.183673 0.591836735 0.295918367 0.246182198
0.8 0.384479 0.630687 0.315344 0.285714 0.642857143 0.321428571 0.255810664
0.9 0.410405 0.675723 0.337861 0.365079 0.682539683 0.341269841 0.269411901 0.317460317
1 0.428571 0.714286 0.357143 0.428571 0.714285714 0.357142857 0.285714286 0.285714286
 








λ b1P b2P b2P(1‐δ) b1S b2S b2S(1‐δ)P o o l i n g  PayoffSep Payoff
0000 0 0 0 0 . 4 1
0.1 0 0.05 0.02 0 0.5 0.2 0.3439
0.2 0 0.1 0.04 0 0.5 0.2 0.2952
0.3 0 0.15 0.06 0 0.5 0.2 0.2533
0.4 0.152352 0.321881 0.128753 0 0.5 0.2
0.5 0.269231 0.451923 0.180769 0 0.5 0.2
0.6 0.338427 0.536899 0.21476 0.074074 0.537037037 0.214814815
0.7 0.382076 0.598349 0.23934 0.206349 0.603174603 0.241269841
0.8 0.410878 0.646527 0.258611 0.305556 0.652777778 0.261111111 0.347222222
0.9 0.430563 0.68681 0.274724 0.382716 0.691358025 0.27654321 0.308641975
1 0.444444 0.722222 0.288889 0.444444 0.722222222 0.288888889 0.277777778
δ =  0.7
λ b1P b2P b2P(1‐δ) b1S b2S b2S(1‐δ)P o o l i n g  PayoffSep Payoff
0000 0 0 0 0 . 3 1
0.1 0 0.05 0.015 0 0.5 0.15 0.257925
0.2 0 0.1 0.03 0 0.5 0.15 0.2214
0.3 0.109117 0.242749 0.072825 0 0.5 0.15
0.4 0.256214 0.404971 0.121491 0 0.5 0.15
0.5 0.336364 0.502273 0.150682 0 0.5 0.15
0.6 0.384423 0.569096 0.170729 0.099099 0.54954955 0.164864865
0.7 0.415063 0.619791 0.185937 0.227799 0.613899614 0.184169884 0.386100386
0.8 0.435459 0.661275 0.198383 0.324324 0.662162162 0.198648649 0.337837838
0.9 0.4495 0.697225 0.209168 0.399399 0.6996997 0.20990991 0.3003003
1 0.459459 0.72973 0.218919 0.459459 0.72972973 0.218918919 0.27027027
δ =  0.8
λ b1P b2P b2P(1‐δ) b1S b2S b2S(1‐δ)P o o l i n g  PayoffSep Payoff
0000 0 0 0 0 . 2 1
0.1 0 0.05 0.01 0 0.5 0.1 0.17195
0.2 0.067105 0.160394 0.032079 0 0.5 0.1
0.3 0.258306 0.36956 0.073912 0 0.5 0.1
0.4 0.347397 0.477917 0.095583 0 0.5 0.1
0.5 0.396552 0.547414 0.109483 0 0.5 0.1
0.6 0.426353 0.598447 0.119689 0.122807 0.561403509 0.112280702 0.438596491
0.7 0.445534 0.639597 0.127919 0.24812 0.62406015 0.12481203 0.37593985
0.8 0.458404 0.675043 0.135009 0.342105 0.671052632 0.134210526 0.328947368
0.9 0.467324 0.707028 0.141406 0.415205 0.707602339 0.141520468 0.292397661
1 0.473684 0.736842 0.147368 0.473684 0.736842105 0.147368421 0.263157895
 








λ b1P b2P b2P(1‐δ) b1S b2S b2S(1‐δ) Pooling PayoffSep Payoff
0000 0 0 0 0 . 1 1
0.1 0.02969 0.078206 0.007821 0 0.5 0.05
0.2 0.300799 0.370719 0.037072 0 0.5 0.05
0.3 0.387323 0.479225 0.047922 0 0.5 0.05
0.4 0.428088 0.54247 0.054247 0 0.5 0.05
0.5 0.45082 0.588115 0.058811 0 0.5 0.05
0.6 0.464735 0.625314 0.062531 0.145299 0.572649573 0.057264957 0.427350427
0.7 0.473767 0.657949 0.065795 0.267399 0.633699634 0.063369963 0.366300366
0.8 0.479872 0.687923 0.068792 0.358974 0.679487179 0.067948718 0.320512821
0.9 0.484129 0.716271 0.071627 0.430199 0.715099715 0.071509972 0.284900285
1 0.487179 0.74359 0.074359 0.487179 0.743589744 0.074358974 0.256410256
δ =  1











10 . 5 0.25
 
 